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[DO NOT PUBLISH]  
In the  
United States Court of Appeals  
For the Eleventh Circuit  
____________________  
No. 21-11767  
Non-Argument Calendar  
____________________  
In Re: WESTPORT HOLDINGS TAMPA, LIMITED  
PARTNERSHIP,  
WESTPORT HOLDINGS TAMPA II, LIMITED  
PARTNERSHIP,  
Debtors.  
___________________________________________________  
VALLEY NATIONAL BANK,  
f.k.a. USAmeribank,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
versus  
JEFFREY WAYNE WARREN,  
as Liquidating Trustee for Westport Holdings Tampa, Limited  
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Opinion of the Court  
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Partnership  
and Westport Holdings Tampa II, Limited Partnership,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
____________________  
Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Florida  
D.C. Docket Nos. 8:20-cv-01777-KKM,  
8:16-bk-08167-MGW  
____________________  
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.  
PER CURIAM:  
Valley National Bank appeals the district court’s order dis-  
missing its appeal from the bankruptcy court’s final order granting  
the litigation funding agreement between Jeffrey Warren (herein-  
after, Liquidating Trustee) and A/Z Property Partners LLC (A/Z).  
The district court dismissed Valley National Bank’s appeal, finding  
that it lacked Article III standing and “person aggrieved” standing  
1
to appeal. After review, we affirm.  
1
We review a district court’s dismissal of a case for lack of standing de novo.  
Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, Fla., 996 F.3d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir. 2021).  
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I. BACKGROUND  
In 2016, Westport Holdings Tampa, Limited Partnership  
(WHT I) and Westport Holdings Tampa II, Limited Partnership  
(WHT II) (collectively, Debtors) filed voluntary Chapter 11 bank-  
ruptcy petitions, which were jointly administered. The bankruptcy  
court appointed Warren as the Liquidating Trustee.  
WHT I operated a continuing care retirement community  
named “University Village,” which included (i) 446 independent  
living apartments; (ii) 46 independent living villas; (iii) a 110-bed  
assisted living facility; and (iv) a 120-bed skilled nursing facility.  
WHT I owned the 446 independent living apartments, WHT II  
owned the 46 independent living villas, and Westport Nursing  
2
Tampa, LLC (WNT) owned the assisted living and skilled nursing  
facilities.  
In May 2018, the bankruptcy court confirmed the Liquidat-  
ing Trustee’s first amended mediated joint plan of liquidation.  
Pursuant to the joint plan, all of the Debtors’ causes of action be-  
came assets of the Liquidating Estate, and the Liquidating Trustee  
was vested with the authority to settle, sell, or dispose of any exist-  
ing causes of action.  
In February 2020, the Liquidating Trustee entered into an  
Asset Purchase Agreement with Tampa Life, wherein the Debtors  
2
WNT is not a debtor. Valley National Bank is a creditor for WNT.  
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agreed to sell substantially all of its assets. In May 2020, the Florida  
Office of Insurance Regulation and Tampa Life entered into a con-  
sent agreement, authorizing Tampa Life to acquire the Debtors’  
assets.  
Meanwhile, in January 2020, the Liquidating Trustee filed a  
complaint against Valley National Bank, creating a separate adver-  
sary proceeding. The Liquidating Trustee asserted claims against  
Valley National Bank, namely, aiding and abetting a breach of a  
fiduciary duty and the avoidance and recovery of a fraudulent  
transfer of $3 million of WHT I’s statutorily required minimum  
liquid reserves in connection with loans made by Valley National  
Bank to WNT.  
Later, in June 2020, the Liquidating Trustee moved the  
bankruptcy court for authority to sell all causes of action against  
Valley National Bank to BRP Senior Housing Management, LLC  
(BRP). Valley National Bank objected to this sale, contending that  
the principal of BRP, Richard Ackerman, took issue with the ad-  
ministrative challenges it had recently presented to the Florida Of-  
fice of Insurance Regulation. According to Valley National Bank,  
Ackerman allegedly threatened that BRP would acquire causes of  
action against it and engage in extensive litigation should it not  
withdraw the administrative challenges.  
Ultimately, the Liquidating Trustee’s proposition to sell the  
causes of action to BRP fell through, and the Liquidating Trustee  
moved the bankruptcy court to instead grant it permission to enter  
into a litigation funding agreement with A/Z Property Partners  
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Opinion of the Court  
5
(A/Z), also managed by Ackerman. The Liquidating Trustee ex-  
plained that, when the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation ap-  
proved the asset purchase agreement between it and Tampa Life,  
it discovered that it did not have sufficient funds to consummate  
the closing of the sale. The Liquidating Trustee also asserted that  
it had valid and substantial claims against Valley National Bank,  
and that A/Z wished to invest with him to facilitate the closing of  
the asset sale to Tampa Life, prosecute the claims against Valley  
National Bank, and profit if the claims were successful.  
Under the agreement, A/Z would pay the Liquidating Trus-  
tee $250,000 at the closing of University Village, and then fund the  
costs associated with prosecuting the causes of action against Val-  
ley National Bank. The Liquidating Trustee had to give A/Z notice  
of a settlement offer, and agreed to not respond to the offer until  
giving A/Z good faith consideration to its analysis of the offer. The  
Liquidating Trustee also agreed to not make settlement offers  
without first giving good faith consideration to A/Z. Finally, the  
Liquidating Trustee did not waive attorney-client privilege of its  
attorney communications, unless consent to waive such privilege  
was given in writing and the information was necessary to assist  
the litigation of claims against Valley National Bank. Notably, the  
Liquidating Trustee remained the ultimate decision-maker, which  
Valley National Bank acknowledged. Ultimately, the bankruptcy  
court granted the Liquidating Trustee permission to enter a litiga-  
tion funding agreement with A/Z.  
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Valley National Bank appealed the order granting the litiga-  
tion funding agreement to the district court, arguing the agreement  
was champertous under Florida law. It also argued that it had Ar-  
ticle III standing, because the litigation funding agreement caused  
an injury in fact by allowing a nonparty to exert control over the  
adversary proceeding, influence a settlement, and prolong the liti-  
gation. It also asserted that it had “person aggrieved” standing, be-  
cause such undue influence affected the integrity and fairness of the  
bankruptcy proceedings.  
At oral argument regarding the standing issues, Valley Na-  
tional Bank confirmed that no settlement agreements had been ex-  
tended by either party, there had been no discovery, and there had  
been “no movement” in the adversary proceeding between it and  
the Liquidating Trustee. It argued the harm specific to it was  
Ackerman’s announcement of his “intention to acquire a cause of  
action” which would keep him from being able to quickly settle  
with the Liquidating Trustee. It contended that the Liquidating  
Trustee, even if he wanted to settle, would be unable to, so he  
could keep Ackerman, the man funding the litigation, happy.  
The district court concluded that Valley National Bank  
lacked Article III standing and “person aggrieved” standing in order  
to appeal the bankruptcy court’s order granting the litigation fund-  
ing agreement. As to Article III standing, the court found that Val-  
ley National Bank failed to sufficiently allege a concrete injury in  
fact that resulted from the bankruptcy court’s order, and the risk of  
future harm was speculative. Next, the court concluded that, even  
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7
if Valley National Bank had Article III standing, its claims still failed  
under “person aggrieved” standing because it suffered no direct  
harm from the litigation funding agreement and the interest it  
sought to vindicate was not protected by the Bankruptcy Code.  
II. DISCUSSION  
A. Article III Standing  
A federal court’s power to hear a case is limited by Article  
III, § 2, of the U.S. Constitution, which dictates that a federal  
court’s judicial power is limited to cases and controversies. Thus,  
the doctrine of standing limits the category of litigants who may  
bring a lawsuit in federal court. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.  
330, 338 (2016). There are three elements to Article III standing.  
Id. A plaintiff must have: “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is  
fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3)  
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id.  
An injury in fact refers to an invasion of a legally protected  
interest that is both (1) “concrete and particularized” and (2) “actual  
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” In re Bay Circle  
Props., LLC, 955 F.3d 874, 879 (11th Cir. 2020) (Bay Circle). Con-  
crete injuries must be real, not abstract. Trichell v. Midland Credit  
Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020).  
For an injury to be imminent, the threatened injury must be  
“certainly impending” and allegations of “possible future injury”  
are not sufficient. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409  
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(2013). Standing cannot rely “on a highly attenuated chain of pos-  
sibilities” or speculation. Id. at 410-14.  
Although plaintiffs need not wait for an injury to occur be-  
fore filing suit, the plaintiff must still at least demonstrate that he is  
in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury, meaning that the  
anticipated injury must occur within a fixed time period in the fu-  
ture. Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 930 F.3d 1225, 1232-33 (11th  
Cir. 2019). If a plaintiff cannot show that injury is likely to occur  
immediately, the plaintiff lacks standing. Id. at 1233. Moreover,  
even if a plaintiff can demonstrate immediacy, he must still show  
that injury is “substantially likely to actually occur,” and that the  
injury is not hypothetical or conjectural. Id.  
The district court did not err in concluding that Valley Na-  
tional Bank lacked Article III standing, because Valley National  
Bank has not articulated a concrete, imminent injury in fact. Valley  
National Bank’s alleged injury is not imminent, and is instead based  
on a speculative, highly attenuated, chain of possibilities. See Clap-  
per, 568 U.S. at 409-10. Valley National Bank’s alleged injury is that  
Ackerman, through A/Z, will unduly influence the adversary pro-  
ceeding between it and the Liquidating Trustee. While Valley Na-  
tional Bank asserts that Ackerman threatened to subject it to  
lengthy litigation, importantly, neither side has offered a settle-  
ment, no discovery has occurred in their proceeding, and there has  
been “no movement” in the case. Because there has been no move-  
ment in the adversary proceeding, Valley National Bank’s alleged  
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9
injury—extensive litigation at the hands of Ackerman—is merely  
speculative.  
Valley National Bank’s alleged injury is also based on a  
highly attenuated chain of possibilities. For Valley National Bank’s  
alleged injury to come to fruition, first, a settlement offer must be  
made, which may or may not occur. Assuming a settlement offer  
is made by Valley National Bank, the Liquidating Trustee would  
then present that settlement to A/Z. Then, the Liquidating Trus-  
tee, although he retained the ultimate decision-making power,  
would have to acquiesce to A/Z’s judgments regarding the offer.  
In this scenario, one must also assume that A/Z’s judgment would  
be one that negatively impacts Valley National Bank and needlessly  
extends the litigation process. Valley National Bank’s alleged in-  
jury, although possible, is clearly based on a highly attenuated  
chain of possibilities, which is insufficient to establish Article III  
standing. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409-14. Even more, this attenu-  
ated chain of events demonstrates that the alleged injury is not sub-  
stantially likely to actually occur, and is instead hypothetical. See  
Corbett, 930 F.3d at 1232-33.  
Thus, Valley National Bank cannot demonstrate that it has,  
or will, suffer an injury in fact, and fails to establish that it has Arti-  
cle III standing.  
B. “Person Aggrieved” Standing  
Beyond Article III standing, we have adopted the “person  
aggrieved” standing doctrine “as our standard for determining  
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whether a party can appeal a bankruptcy court’s order.” In re Ernie  
Haire Ford, Inc., 764 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2014) (Ernie Haire).  
This standard restricts a plaintiff’s standing more than Article III.  
Bay Circle, 955 F.3d at 879. Under this standard, a party may only  
appeal a bankruptcy court order if the party had a direct and sub-  
stantial interest in the question being appealed. Ernie Haire, 764  
F.3d at 1325. An “aggrieved person” is an individual who is “di-  
rectly, adversely, and pecuniarily affected” by the bankruptcy  
court’s order. Id. (citation and brackets omitted).  
A party is not aggrieved under this standard when the only  
interest allegedly harmed by the bankruptcy court’s order is the  
party’s interest in “avoiding liability from an adversary proceed-  
ing.” Id. at 1325-26. An order subjecting a party to litigation only  
indirectly harms that party, and orders allowing litigation to con-  
tinue do not burden a party’s ability to defend against liability. Id.  
at 1326. Accordingly, when a party’s “sole interest is that of an ad-  
versary defendant in avoiding liability,” he is not a person ag-  
grieved by the bankruptcy court’s order. Id. at 1327.  
Additionally, a person cannot be aggrieved if the interest he  
seeks to validate is not protected or regulated by the Bankruptcy  
Code. Id. at 1326. Notably, an adversary defendant’s interest in  
avoiding liability is “antithetical to the goals” of the Bankruptcy  
Code. Id. at 1327.  
Finally, an individual may not meet the “person aggrieved”  
doctrine simply by virtue of attacking the inherent fairness of the  
bankruptcy proceedings. Bay Circle, 955 F.3d at 879. Instead, a  
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11  
party must show both “a direct harm and hold an interest within  
the scope of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 880 (emphasis in origi-  
nal).  
Even if Valley National Bank had Article III standing, its ap-  
peal is still subject to dismissal, for it does not have “persons ag-  
grieved” standing. As explained above, Valley National Bank has  
suffered no direct harm based on the litigation funding agreement.  
Instead, its main concern is how A/Z may influence possible set-  
tlement agreements between it and the Liquidating Trustee. How-  
ever, Valley National Bank is simply an adversary defendant whose  
sole interest is in avoiding liability by attempting to ensure that the  
Litigating Trustee cannot continue to pursue litigation against it.  
Thus, Valley National Bank is not a person aggrieved by the bank-  
ruptcy court’s order. See Ernie Haire, 764 F.3d at 1327. This sole  
interest is also not an interest protected by the Bankruptcy Code.  
See id.  
Valley National Bank attempts to establish standing by argu-  
ing that its claim is an attempt to preserve fairness in the bank-  
ruptcy proceedings. However, such a claim cannot establish “per-  
son aggrieved” standing. See Bay Circle, 955 F.3d at 879. Accord-  
ingly, Valley National Bank lacks standing under the “person ag-  
grieved” doctrine, as well.  
C. Merits of the Litigation Funding Agreement  
Valley National Bank also asks this Court to determine if the  
litigation funding agreement was champertous under Florida law.  
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However, we cannot rule on the merits of a case after finding that  
the plaintiff lacks standing. See Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach,  
Fla., 996 F.3d 1110, 1115 (11th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, we decline  
to consider this argument.  
III. CONCLUSION  
Based on the above, the district court did not err in conclud-  
ing that Valley National Bank lacked both Article III standing and  
“person aggrieved” standing. We affirm the district court.  
AFFIRMED.  
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT  
ELBERT PARR TUTTLE COURT OF APPEALS BUILDING  
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.  
Atlanta, Georgia 30303  
David J. Smith  
Clerk of Court  
For rules and forms visit  
www.ca11.uscourts.gov  
March 31, 2022  
MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES  
Appeal Number: 21-11767-GG  
Case Style: Valley National Bank v. Jeffrey Warren  
District Court Docket No: 8:20-cv-01777-KKM  
Secondary Case Number: 8:16-bk-08167-MGW  
Electronic Filing  
All counsel must file documents electronically using the Electronic Case Files ("ECF") system,  
unless exempted for good cause. Although not required, non-incarcerated pro se parties are  
permitted to use the ECF system by registering for an account at www.pacer.gov. Information  
and training materials related to electronic filing are available on the Court's website. Enclosed  
is a copy of the court's decision filed today in this appeal. Judgment has this day been entered  
pursuant to FRAP 36. The court's mandate will issue at a later date in accordance with FRAP  
41(b).  
The time for filing a petition for rehearing is governed by 11th Cir. R. 40-3, and the time for  
filing a petition for rehearing en banc is governed by 11th Cir. R. 35-2. Except as otherwise  
provided by FRAP 25(a) for inmate filings, a petition for rehearing or for rehearing en banc is  
timely only if received in the clerk's office within the time specified in the rules. Costs are  
governed by FRAP 39 and 11th Cir.R. 39-1. The timing, format, and content of a motion for  
attorney's fees and an objection thereto is governed by 11th Cir. R. 39-2 and 39-3.  
Please note that a petition for rehearing en banc must include in the Certificate of Interested  
Persons a complete list of all persons and entities listed on all certificates previously filed by  
any party in the appeal. See 11th Cir. R. 26.1-1. In addition, a copy of the opinion sought to be  
reheard must be included in any petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See  
11th Cir. R. 35-5(k) and 40-1 .  
Counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) must submit a voucher claiming  
compensation for time spent on the appeal no later than 60 days after either issuance of mandate  
or filing with the U.S. Supreme Court of a petition for writ of certiorari (whichever is later) via  
the eVoucher system. Please contact the CJA Team at (404) 335-6167 or  
cja_evoucher@ca11.uscourts.gov for questions regarding CJA vouchers or the eVoucher  
system.  
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Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 39, costs taxed against the appellant.  
Please use the most recent version of the Bill of Costs form available on the court's website at  
www.ca11.uscourts.gov.  
For questions concerning the issuance of the decision of this court, please call the number  
referenced in the signature block below. For all other questions, please call Joseph Caruso, GG  
at (404) 335-6177.  
Sincerely,  
DAVID J. SMITH, Clerk of Court  
Reply to: Djuanna H. Clark  
Phone #: 404-335-6151  
OPIN-1A Issuance of Opinion With Costs